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ABSTRACT 
  The summer of 2020 presented the American public with two very 
different versions of how a state’s top prosecutor might respond to 
excessive use of force by law enforcement. In Kentucky, Attorney 
General Daniel Cameron was criticized for his conduct after stories 
emerged of his biased presentation to a grand jury contemplating 
whether officers should face criminal charges for killing an unarmed 
person, Breonna Taylor, in her own home. In Minnesota, Attorney 
General Keith Ellison proved to be less controversial as public 
sentiment emphasized his willingness to pursue the type of justice that 
the public demanded against all of the officers involved in killing an 
unarmed George Floyd upon suspicion that he used a counterfeit $20 
bill. The outcome of the criminal charges against the officers involved 
in the killing of George Floyd remains to be seen, but the transparency 
of Attorney General Ellison’s decisions fostered positive reactions 
from those evaluating his use of the criminal process.  
  The unique moment of racial reckoning about law enforcement’s 
racial bias in its use of force that has resulted from the events of the 
summer has brought to the surface some hidden truths about the 
criminal process. Most clearly, the difference in outcome and public 
perceptions of the criminal investigations into the deaths of Breonna 
Taylor and George Floyd brings to the forefront the extent to which the 
grand jury process allows a prosecutor to “perform” the prosecutorial 
function without actually engaging in what the public would consider a 
good-faith examination of the evidence. What is also clear is that, when 
prosecutors rely on police investigation decisions that themselves may 
have originated from racial bias,there is limited confidence the nation 
can have that the criminal process is free from racial bias.  
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  A moment such as this, marked by massive public protest about 
racial inequities in the criminal justice system, requires prosecutors to 
carefully examine their standard prosecutorial practice and remove any 
processes that could facilitate or enhance racial inequities. In other 
words, prosecutors should accept these public protests as formal notice 
that something is awry, that they need to carefully examine their legal 
practice, and that they must fix any problems they find in that 
examination. This Essay explores two important ways to address the 
problems brought to the forefront by the criminal processes resulting 
from Breonna Taylor’s and George Floyd’s deaths. These would be to 
confront how both the grand jury process and the widespread, 
systematic acceptance of police officer narratives for initial charging 
decisions can foster racial bias. These two realities can hide the 
influence of racial bias in what appears to be a neutral criminal process, 
thus allowing the prosecution to perform as a minister of justice while 
actually reinforcing the very systemic marginalization that this moment 
of reckoning and the prosecutor’s own ethical obligations demands be 
addressed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 13, 2020, plainclothes police officers from the Louisville 
Metro Police Department fatally shot 26-year-old Breonna Taylor in 
her apartment.1 According to early police statements, officers arrived 
at the home to serve a warrant on an individual who did not live at that 
address and fired gunshots in response to gunfire initiated by Kenneth 
Walker, Taylor’s boyfriend.2 In the dozens of gunshots fired during the 
 
 1.  See Darcy Costello & Tessa Duvall, Breonna Taylor Shooting: What Happened the Night 
Louisville Police Fatally Shot Breonna Taylor, USA TODAY (May 15, 2020, 8:23 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/05/15/minute-minute-account-breonna-
taylor-fatal-shooting-louisville-police/5196867002 [https://perma.cc/V7UV-24RH].  
 2.  See Christina Carrega & Sabina Ghebremedhin, Timeline: Inside the Investigation of 
Breonna Taylor’s Killing and Its Aftermath, ABC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2020, 11:31 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/timeline-inside-investigation-breonna-taylors-killing-
aftermath/story?id=71217247 [https://perma.cc/CS9G-G2HG]; Dylan Lovan, ‘Somebody Shot My 
Girlfriend’: 911 Call in Police Shooting, ABC NEWS (May 28, 2020, 4:12 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/shot-girlfriend-911-call-police-shooting-70940401 
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interaction, one police officer was shot in the leg, Walker was unhurt, 
and Taylor was struck by eight bullets.3 Protests ensued soon after the 
shooting,4 as the public questioned how an innocent Black woman 
could be shot and killed in her own apartment.  
Six months later, Daniel Cameron, the Kentucky Attorney 
General, announced a grand jury decision in Taylor’s killing that 
angered many.5 According to Cameron, the grand jury had been 
presented with relevant evidence and had decided to only issue 
criminal charges against one of the three police officers who were 
present at the scene.6 This officer was charged with wantonly 
endangering Taylor’s neighbors with his errant gunshots.7 As 
frustrated commentators noted, even though Taylor had been an 
innocent woman killed in her own apartment home, the grand jury had 
effectively charged the police officers with criminal behavior only for 
the shots that had missed hitting Taylor.8  
On May 25, 2020, less than two months after Taylor was killed, a 
video was made of a police officer from the Minneapolis Police 
Department kneeling on the neck of George Floyd, an unarmed 46-
year-old Black man; three other officers stood nearby. Over the next 
few weeks, millions of people would watch the last 9 minutes and 29 
seconds of Floyd’s life as he struggled to breathe under the weight of 
 
[https://perma.cc/MH3B-84X3]. Officers sought the no-knock warrant to enter Taylor’s 
apartment because they believed her ex-boyfriend was using her address to mail drugs. Carrega 
& Ghebremedhin, supra. 
 3.  See Lovan, supra note 2. 
 4.  See Bailey Loosemore, Breonna Taylor Protests in Louisville: What Activists Want, and 
What They’ve Accomplished, USA TODAY (Oct. 2, 2020, 6:01 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2020/10/02/breonna-taylor-what-you-need-know-louisville-protests/
5879867002 [https://perma.cc/3AUV-KJ56]. 
 5.  See AG Daniel Cameron Press Conference Transcript September 23: Breonna Taylor 
Decision, REV (Sept. 23, 2020), [hereinafter Daniel Cameron Transcript] https://www.rev.com/
blog/transcripts/ag-daniel-cameron-press-conference-transcript-september-23-breonna-taylor-
decision [https://perma.cc/B7UA-JRCH]; Erik Ortiz, Kentucky AG Daniel Cameron Takes Heat 
After No Direct Charges Are Filed in Breonna Taylor’s Death, NBC (Sept. 23, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/kentucky-ag-daniel-cameron-takes-heat-after-no-
direct-charges-n1240886 [https://perma.cc/HYJ3-6L2R]. 
 6.  See Daniel Cameron Transcript, supra note 5. 
 7.  See Breonna Taylor: Police Officer Charged But Not Over Death, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54273317 [https://perma.cc/C6TS-2KFQ] 
(noting that the officer was charged with wanton endangerment for firing into a neighbor’s 
apartment during the raid).  
 8.  See, e.g., Charles M. Blow, Breonna Taylor and Perpetual Black Trauma, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/opinion/breonna-taylor-black-trauma.html 
[https://perma.cc/6SAN-W93R] (“In essence, a former officer was charged for the shots that 
missed [Breonna Taylor].”). 
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the kneeling police officer, crying to his deceased mother for help.9 
This video shocked many and led to nationwide protests. On May 29, 
2020, just four days after Floyd’s death, the local prosecutor brought 
criminal charges against the officer who knelt on Floyd’s neck.10 By 
June 3, 2021, charges were also brought against the three other officers 
who stood nearby.11 The case against the police officers was soon 
transferred to Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison, after local 
and state officials raised concerns about the county prosecutor’s ability 
to handle the prosecution without undue influence.12 Trials for each of 
the four officers accused of playing a role in killing Floyd were set to 
begin less than a year after he was killed.13  
This Essay unfolds in three parts. Part I provides the relevant 
background for understanding how the criminal process has responded 
to the deaths of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd. Part II describes 
more fully the problem presented when prosecutors make charging 
 
 9.  ABC News, Opening Statements in the Trial of Derek Chauvin, YOUTUBE, at 3:25–5:00 
(Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UwDQ30MNVKs [https://perma.cc/J67C-
BUNU].  
 10.  See Complaint at 1, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Minn. D. Ct. May 29, 2020). 
The officer was originally charged with third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter. Id. 
The Minnesota State Attorney General later announced upgraded charges of second-degree 
murder would be sought against the officer. See Max Cohen, Charges Upgraded Against Former 
Minneapolis Officer Derek Chauvin in George Floyd Death, POLITICO (June 3, 2020, 4:31 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/03/minnesota-charges-3-more-former-officers-in-george-
floyd-death-298949 [https://perma.cc/Z5JH-82VE]. 
 11.  AP, Key Events Since George Floyd’s Arrest and Death, VOA (Mar. 7, 2021), 
https://www.voanews.com/usa/race-america/key-events-george-floyds-arrest-and-death 
[https://perma.cc/8N4P-QLRF].  
 12.  Alex Johnson, Minnesota Attorney General to Take Over Prosecutions In George Floyd’s 
Death, NBC NEWS (May 31, 2020, 5:40 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/minnesota-
attorney-general-take-over-prosecutions-george-floyd-s-death-n1220636 
[https://perma.cc/QQX7-TWWK]. Ten members of the Minneapolis Delegation wrote to the 
Governor asking that the jurisdiction over the case be transferred to the Attorney General’s 
Office. See Press Release, Minnesota House of Representatives, Minneapolis Delegation Sends 
Letter to Governor Tim Walz (May 29, 2020), https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/members/
profile/news/15468/29981 [https://perma.cc/7KEL-3JCE]. The letter was written in response to 
public outcry at the local prosecutor suggesting there could be exculpatory evidence exonerating 
the officers at a press conference. Id. In response to the press conference, many felt concerned 
that the county attorney’s office could not investigate and prosecute these cases. Id.  
 13.  David K. Li, Former Minneapolis Police Officer Derek Chauvin To Be Tried Separately 
in George Floyd Death Case, NBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2021, 11:41 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/former-minneapolis-police-officer-derek-chauvin-be-tried-separately-george-
n1253905 [https://perma.cc/YT2U-37E5]. On March 29, 2021, the trial against Derek Chauvin, the 
officer who knelt on Floyd’s neck, began. Janell Ross & Melissa Chan, ‘America is on Trial’ as 
Derek Chauvin Faces Justice in the Death of George Floyd, TIME (Mar. 29, 2021, 12:12 PM), 
https://time.com/5950398/derek-chauvin-trial-george-floyd-opening [https://perma.cc/CRT2-
MF8Y]. 
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decisions that either rely on police officers’ arrest decisions or question 
the appropriateness of police officers’ use of force. Part III explains 
how the grand jury process can unjustly enable a prosecutor to follow 
the letter of the law while ensuring her own biased judgment prevails 
in the grand jury’s charging decision and the prosecutor’s use of police 
officer narratives to make charging decisions are examples of how law 
can be practiced in an understated discriminatory fashion in violation 
of ethical rules that guide legal practice. This Essay posits that 
prosecutors should reexamine their use of both of these mechanisms as 
they allow racial bias to easily infect the criminal process. It provides 
two possible solutions: a formal policy for the presentation of evidence 
to a grand jury where possible in police officer use of force cases and 
engaging in further investigation when law enforcement provides its 
own narratives of probable cause that may have been influenced by 
racial bias to determine if that is indeed the case. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
At the earliest stage of every criminal proceeding, the question 
that must be answered by the prosecution before filing a criminal 
complaint is whether there is probable cause to conclude that a crime 
has occurred.14 Ordinarily, this question can be answered through the 
prosecutor’s own evaluation of the available evidence and subsequent 
presentation to the court in a preliminary hearing.15 In some cases, the 
question either can be or must be answered through a grand jury 
process whereby members of the community evaluate the evidence 
presented by the prosecutor and issue their own finding.16 Probable 
cause is considered a relatively low standard, only requiring proof that 
some criminal behavior has occurred, and the accused person is likely 
responsible.17 The significant uproar after the grand jury failed to 
 
 14.  Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended 
restraint of liberty following arrest.”). 
 15.  Scholars have described the inherent racialized problems with these decisions. See 
generally Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of the 
Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202 (2007) (noting the role prosecutors play in 
fostering racial disparities with their charging decisions).  
 16.  If the prosecutor makes the evaluation and files the complaint, a court must make its 
own probable cause determination soon after. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 118–19. If a grand jury 
determines probable cause exists, then the court is not required to hold its own subsequent 
probable cause hearing. Id. at 117 n.20. 
 17.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231–32 (1983). There is evidence that the finding for 
probable cause in Taylor’s case was inadequate and misleading. See Jason Riley, Breonna Taylor 
Warrant Was ‘Misleading,’ Louisville Police Investigators Find, WDRB (Oct. 7, 2020), 
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return an indictment for homicide or a related charge against the 
officers involved in Taylor’s shooting18 reflected the public’s 
incredulousness at the outcome. It was shocking to many that an 
innocent woman could be killed in her own home by law enforcement 
without there being enough evidence that something criminal had 
occurred to meet the low probable cause standard.  
The grand jury process inspired strong criticism and suspicion. 
Indeed, on November 25, 2020, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
(“LDF”), one of the nation’s leading civil rights organizations, issued a 
report concluding that Cameron had presented a biased view of the 
case that favored law enforcement to the grand jury.19 According to the 
report, Cameron refused to even present the grand jury with potential 
homicide charges or explain how the claimed initial shots by Walker 
could have been justified under existing self-defense principles.20 The 
report described how such a presentation prevented the grand jury 
from reaching any finding that differed from Cameron’s conclusion 
that there was no probable cause for any crimes against Breonna 
Taylor.21  
The public conversation following the criminal investigation into 
the killing of George Floyd was markedly different. Although 
Attorney General Ellison had no prior experience as a prosecutor 
before his election to the Minnesota attorney general seat, and the 
attorney general’s office rarely handled criminal cases, Ellison was 
lauded as a prosecutor who was pursuing every avenue to ensure the 





 18.  Kate Linthicum, Protests Erupt After Grand Jury Does Not Charge Louisville Officers 
in Killing of Breonna Taylor, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020, 9:03 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
world-nation/story/2020-09-23/grand-jury-indictment-in-breonna-taylor-case [https://perma.cc/
58EH-QGTK]. 
 19.  JUST. IN PUB. SAFETY PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, JUSTICE 
DENIED: A CALL FOR A NEW GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION INTO THE KILLING OF BREONNA 
TAYLOR 3 (2020), https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/LDF_10272020_BreonnaTaylor
-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CU6-4FHM]. 
 20.  Id. (citing to the grand jury report recordings). 
 21.  Justice Denied: An Overview of the Grand Jury Proceedings in the Breonna Taylor Case, 
JUST. IN PUB. SAFETY PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, 
https://www.naacpldf.org/justice-denied-a-call-for-a-new-grand-jury-investigation-into-the-
police-shooting-of-breonna-taylor [https://perma.cc/A6ZT-Z64G]. 
 22.  See Ben Terris, Americans Want Justice for George Floyd. Keith Ellison Is in Charge of 
Getting It., WASH. POST (June 18, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
style/americans-want-justice-for-george-floyd-keith-ellison-is-in-charge-of-getting-it/2020/06/
17/243ba312-b012-11ea-856d-5054296735e5_story.html [https://perma.cc/KC3M-EBX2]. It is 
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case about the killing of Floyd was actually initiated without a grand 
jury determination of probable cause.23 Instead, the decision reflected 
the judgment of county prosecutors that the evidence presented was 
sufficient to indicate some crime had occurred and the officer who 
knelt on Floyd’s neck for 9 minutes and 29 seconds was responsible.24  
In the criminal process, prosecutors are ministers of justice and 
facilitators of the safety and well-being of the community they were 
elected to serve. Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
attempts to capture the twin responsibility and authority prosecutors 
possess in those roles.25 The Rules require all lawyers to engage in legal 
practices that maintain the integrity of the legal system and advance 
improvements where necessary.26 The Rules go further to mandate 
special responsibilities for prosecutors in Rule 3.8. This Rule notes the 
responsibility of prosecutors to practice in a way that accounts for their 
unique ability to use the power of government to affect people’s lives 
and liberty.27 It provides guidance for prosecutors to do so ethically.28  
Rule 3.8, titled “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,” begins 
by stating that a prosecutor in a criminal case shall not pursue a 
criminal charge unless the prosecutor knows it is supported by 
probable cause.29 This rule reflects general constitutional principles but 
also seems to recognize that even with this basic constitutional floor, 
prosecutors could operate in a manner that abuses their awesome 
 
worth considering if this is reflective of Ellison having less connections or partiality to the criminal 
and law enforcement institutions in Minnesota.  
 23.  See Jacob Gershman & Deanna Paul, Criminal Charges in George Floyd’s Death Set Up 
Legal Battle, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2020, 11:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/criminal-charges-
in-george-floyds-death-set-up-legal-battle-11590791419 [https://perma.cc/448G-9AE6] (noting 
how quickly prosecutors charged both Derek Chauvin with third-degree murder, manslaughter, 
and, later, second-degree murder for the killing of Floyd and the other three officers involved in 
the killing with aiding and abetting second-degree murder). 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (requiring 
prosecutors to “refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by 
probable cause”). 
 26.  Rules 8.1–8.5 are contained under the heading “Maintaining the Integrity of the 
Profession.”  
 27.  See id. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (noting that 
“[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate,” 
which carries “specific obligations”). 
 28.  See generally id. r. 3.8 (providing several rules for prosecutors, including the disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence, assuring the defendant is apprised of her rights to counsel, and refraining 
from certain extrajudicial statements).  
 29.  Id. r. 3.8(a). This could also be coupled with the American Bar Association’s adoption 
of Model Rule 8.4(g) prohibiting attorneys from practicing law in a discriminatory manner. See 
id. r. 8.4(g).  
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authority. For example, a prosecutor could await a formal court 
determination, perhaps initiated by a defense filing if not simple court 
calendaring rules, for a defendant to be released by court order stating 
that the available evidence is insufficient to warrant a hold, instead of 
just dismissing a case she knows is not supported by probable cause.30 
In refusing to dismiss such an unsupported case, a prosecutor could 
force a defendant to experience the challenges of facing a criminal 
charge, whether it be continued incarceration or simply uncertainty 
about the future, for a substantial period of time. Additionally, in 
placing this ethical requirement on the prosecutor, Rule 3.8 provides a 
second layer of review in case either the grand jury or the court makes 
mistakes in their own probable cause finding. This could happen if 
more information comes to light after the probable cause hearing 
because of the type of continued investigation that often occurs after 
an arrest is made.31 Rule 3.8 thus places the onus on the prosecutor to 
be proactive in caring for the defendant through probable cause 
findings by placing the prosecutor’s bar license on the line.32  
The Model Rules require prosecutors to follow all of the attendant 
rules and not just those provided in its Special Rule for Prosecutors. 
This means the recent addition of Rule 8.4(g), as well as our growing 
understanding of how racial bias infects the criminal process, provides 
additional context for the prosecutor’s probable cause determination.33 
 
 30.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 991(a) (1980) (“If the defendant is in custody  . . . and, if 
the public offense is a misdemeanor to which the defendant has pleaded not guilty, the magistrate, 
on motion of counsel for the defendant or the defendant, shall determine whether there is 
probable cause  . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 995(a) (1982) (providing that, upon the defendant’s 
motion, a California trial court shall set aside the indictment or information if the defendant has 
been indicted or committed “without reasonable or probable cause”).  
 31.  “The Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland requires the prosecution to 
disclose evidence that establishes the defendant’s factual innocence during a trial.” Michael 
Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady 
Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3599 (2014) (discussing Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). Because the right protects the fairness of a trial, the prosecutor’s 
obligation to disclose material exculpatory evidence does not cease with a court’s probable cause 
determination. See id. Numerous writers have argued that prosecutors’ obligations under Brady 
also apply during the plea bargaining phases. Id. at 3641. See generally Colin Miller, The Right to 
Evidence of Innocence Before Pleading Guilty, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271 (2019) (arguing that 
under the caselaw that inspired Brady, prosecutors have an obligation during the plea bargaining 
context to disclose exculpatory evidence). 
 32.  See Disbar, LEGAL INFO. INST. (May 2020), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/disbar 
[https://perma.cc/VTV5-5W4C] (“Causes of disbarment may include: a felony involving ‘moral 
turpitude,’ forgery, fraud, a history of dishonesty, consistent lack of attention to clients . . . or any 
pattern of violation of the professional code of ethics.”). 
 33.  This rule has met with both substantial support and fierce opposition. See Irene 
Oritseweyinmi Joe, Regulating Implicit Bias in Federal Criminal Process, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 965, 
976 (2020) (explaining how federal courts should account for this rule in their courtroom 
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Rule 8.4(g) prescribes that it is misconduct for a lawyer to engage in 
any behavior that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is 
discriminatory on the basis of race. Rule 3.8 and Rule 8.4(g) combine 
in a way that suggests prosecutors should consider whether the process 
by which they determine a case is supported by probable cause relies 
on racial bias or other discriminatory motivations.34 The criminal 
processes that followed the killings of Breonna Taylor and George 
Floyd present areas that are ripe for such misconduct.  
Both prosecutorial charging decisions based on officer narratives 
and grand jury deliberations are subject to little public review—with 
grand jury deliberations being secret and prosecutors possessing 
almost unlimited charging discretion.35 Using the grand jury, however, 
 
procedures). Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Vermont 
adopted some variation of 8.4(g) after 2016. ME. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (BD. 
OVERSEERS BAR 2019); MO. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (MO. SUP. CT. 2019); N.H. 
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (N.H. BAR ASS’N 2019); N.M. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 
16-804(g) (N.M. SUP. CT. 2019); PENN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (PENN. SUP. CT. 2020); 
VT. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (VT. SUP. CT. 2017). Others have adopted comments 
regarding discrimination. See AM. BAR ASS’N, JURISDICTIONAL ADOPTION OF RULE 8.4(G) OF 
THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1–7 (2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/chart_
adopt_8_4_g.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CZB-N6FT]. Several states, however, have versions of rules 
that preexist 8.4(g), but guard against discrimination by attorneys in at least some contexts. See, 
e.g., CALIF. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4.1 (STATE BAR OF CALIF. 2018); COLO. RULES OF 
PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (COLO. BAR ASS’N 2020); FLA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4-8.4(d) 
(FLA. BAR 2018); ILL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) & cmt. 3 (SUP. CT. ILL. 2010). Several 
states have explicitly rejected Model Rule 8.4g. Kim Colby, South Dakota Supreme Court Rejects 
a Version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Mar. 12, 2020), https://fedsoc.org/
commentary/fedsoc-blog/south-dakota-supreme-court-rejects-a-version-of-aba-model-rule-8-4-g 
[https://perma.cc/JJ48-6WPX] (At least thirteen states are known to have rejected, or abandoned 
efforts to adopt, a version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and 
Texas.). The arguments in opposition to this rule focus primarily on First Amendment 
implications and a potential chilling effect on freedom of speech. See Joseph Brophy, ABA Rule 
8.4(g) Struck Down by Federal Court, MARICOPA LAW. (Jan. 2021), https://www.jhc.law/wp-
content/uploads/sites/1600623/2021/01/ABA-Rule-8-4-g-Struck-Down-by-Federal-Court.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4GJQ-TXU5]. 
 34.  See K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an 
Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 287 (2014) (“[C]hief 
prosecutors [should] . . . decline to prosecute minor offenses where arrest patterns show a 
disparate impact on racial minorities or where overburdened prosecutors and courts cannot 
provide procedural justice.”). 
 35.  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–66 (1996) (discussing prosecutorial 
charging discretion and the elements of a selective prosecution claim); Alanna Durkin Richer, 
AP Explains: Powerful Grand Juries Stay Shrouded in Secrecy, AP (Sept. 24, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/article/breonna-taylor-shootings-police-juries-courts-
ae8527aa406ea4c7dd35fac4f7203f66 [https://perma.cc/REW6-CXX9] (“But critics [of grand jury 
secrecy] say the secrecy makes it impossible for the public to scrutinize the work of the 
prosecutors and hold them accountable and creates the impression that the process is unfair.”). 
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in a police officer shooting case such as that of Taylor not only permits 
the prosecutor to present facts in a light that might reflect her own 
racial bias but also gives her bias a sense of formal neutrality. The 
added layer of a group of community members who make the formal 
decision gives the impression that the prosecutor did not make the 
formal charging decision when in fact, as shown by the LDF study, the 
very evidence presented and the charges proposed are what the 
prosecutor thinks is appropriate.36 In this situation, the grand jury 
process appears to give the prosecutor an easy out—the ability to claim 
she pursued using the formal channels of the criminal process against 
a potential defendant when that may not actually be the case.37 
Similarly, relying on a police officer’s recitation of facts supporting 
an allegation of criminal conduct allows racial bias to infect the 
criminal process. For example, the police response to a possible arrest 
for using a counterfeit $20 bill in the George Floyd case provides 
evidence of the type of racialized motivations that can lead police 
officers to patrol certain neighborhoods and perceive criminal 
behavior more easily in people of color. Studies have shown that crime 
occurs in all types of neighborhoods.38 However, both explicit and 
implicit biases lead people to view certain areas as more crime-ridden 
and certain people as more crime-oriented. If police officers are 
making patrol and arrest decisions from discriminatory perspective, 
then prosecutors who rely on their decisions are adopting this racial 
bias in their practice of law. Both this practice and the use of the grand 
jury to suggest a neutral application of such bias contravene the 
purposes of both Rule 3.8 and Rule 8.4(g) by allowing, if not placing, 
the prosecutor in a position where their discriminatory decisions 
actually initiate or circumvent the criminal process. 
II.  THE INEQUITY OF THE USUAL PROBABLE CAUSE INQUIRY 
As stated above, ethical rules guiding prosecutors’ charging 
decisions require prosecutors to refuse to initiate, or continue forward, 
in a criminal case if the prosecutor knows the case is not supported by 
probable cause. Some offices go beyond this requirement and charge 
their line prosecutors to move forward on a criminal case only if they 
 
 36.  See JUST. IN PUB. SAFETY PROJECT, supra note 19, at 3.  
 37.  For further examples of this, see the discussion infra Part III.  
 38.  See generally Adam Benforado, The Geography of Criminal Law, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
823, 846–48 (2010) (describing the various factors that can produce crime in a neighborhood). 
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believe they can prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt,39 the more 
demanding standard of proof required to find a defendant guilty at 
trial.40 This moment of racial reckoning,41 however, has made more 
salient a point about police bias and concentration that has been 
recognized by marginalized communities for decades. That is, the 
police targeting of certain individuals and communities heavily 
contributes to the disproportionate outcomes based on race that exist 
in the criminal justice system.  
If prosecutors recognize that selective policing maintains the racial 
and social inequities of the criminal justice system, then their sole 
inquiry when deciding whether to proceed with a criminal case should 
not be whether the evidence presented by the investigating officer is 
sufficient to establish probable cause or prove a case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Instead, in instances where an officer decides to 
make an arrest, prosecutors should consider the circumstances that led 
the officer to the environment where that officer made the arrest.42 
Selective or disproportionate policing means that officers are more 
likely to find criminal behavior in the neighborhoods they choose to 
target. If this targeted policing is done in a racially biased manner or 
based on racialized motivations, then it is tainted by the stain of racial 
discrimination. Prosecutors should consider these cases, even if they 
are supported by probable cause, as illegitimate and use their 
discretion to refrain from moving the cases forward. Indeed, to do so 
could implicate ethical rules prohibiting discriminatory practices.  
The reasoning that would permit the justifiable refusal to move 
forward in the criminal prosecution of these cases would be similar to 
the fruit of the poisonous tree arguments that already exist in criminal 
procedure doctrine. This doctrine combines with the exclusionary rule 
to exclude evidence that is obtained in relation to an unconstitutional 
 
 39.  See, e.g., Charging Decision, DENVER DA, https://www.denverda.org/charging-decision 
[https://perma.cc/V8KJ-JJMK] (“If a determination is made that the facts do not support a 
reasonable belief the charge can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there is a legal and ethical 
duty to decline to file charges.”). 
 40.  See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (upholding the beyond reasonable 
doubt standard as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 41.  See Leah Asmelash, How Black Lives Matter Went from a Hashtag to a Global Rallying 
Cry, CNN (July 26, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/26/us/black-lives-matter-
explainer-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/65D7-FJK5] (documenting the contemporary origins 
and evolution of the Black Lives Matter movement). 
 42.  This could be done by simply keeping records of whether a police officer was responding 
to a call from a witness to criminal behavior or just approached the defendant as part of a patrol. 
The prosecutor could question the police officer about what led them to patrol the area and 
compare patrolling decisions to other neighborhoods.  
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act.43 Prosecutors should question whether the arresting officer’s 
presence in a certain area was based on or influenced by racial 
prejudice.44 If so, the officer’s very presence in the location was 
improper and anything obtained after that, even if lawful, should play 
a limited role in the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute. Instead, the 
prosecutor should determine whether relying on the officer’s 
discriminatory behavior would render the prosecutor’s pursuit of 
criminal charges a continuation of the officer’s racially biased behavior. 
Only after engaging in this exploration can the prosecutor make a 
reasoned and ethical decision about whether to move forward on a 
criminal case and limit such a process from being tainted by racial bias. 
There are a number of ways that policing can be conducted in a 
discriminatory manner. These range from the individual decisions a 
police officer makes to the practices and policies that a police 
department or agency chooses to follow. Even if a law exists on the 
books that provides clear terms for identifying criminal behavior and a 
police officer has significant evidence that this behavior has occurred, 
that officer can choose whether to arrest the individual.45 Additionally, 
police departments engage in their own form of triage in selecting when 
and where to patrol, and the methods they will use while doing it.46  
Selective policing is not automatically a “bad” thing. Indeed, as 
Professor Monica Bell has noted in her work, having police officers 
fully reconcile with the communities that they patrol might help 
 
 43.  Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).  
 44.  Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal Justice System Is Racist. 
Here’s the Proof., WASH. POST (June 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2020/opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-justice-system/#Policing 
[https://perma.cc/ZT7F-RKQ8]; see also I. Bennett Capers, Against Prosecutors, 105 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1561, 1563–67 (2020) (criticizing prosecutors for their role in a highly flawed criminal justice 
system); GEORGE L. KELLING, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., RESEARCH REPORT: “BROKEN 
WINDOWS” AND POLICE DISCRETION iii (1999) (seeking to “understand better why officers make 
arrests in some circumstances and not others”); id. at 51 (suggesting an approach by which police 
identify neighborhood priorities and rank problems within those priorities, then consider tactical 
options depending on resources of neighborhoods). 
 45.  Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1512–16 (2007); 
Jillian K. Swencionis & Phillip Atiba Goff, The Psychological Science of Racial Bias and Policing, 
23 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 398, 399–400 (2017) (noting significant discretion is a risk factor for 
discriminatory behavior).  
 46.  See generally Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public 
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997) (explaining a 
new form of policing oriented around problem-solving and how it relates to a traditional 
understanding of police discretion).  
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improve the very nature of policing.47 This reconciliation would have 
to consider the systemic problems that have plagued the relationship 
between law enforcement and the communities they serve by 
policing.48 In its absence, though, racial bias, either explicit or implicit, 
could still form the basis for policing decisions. Prosecutors should 
pursue ways to ensure that racially biased police procedures, such as 
which neighborhoods to monitor more closely and what behavior is 
considered suspicious, do not infect a line prosecutor’s decisions on 
when, and how, to charge those who may have violated criminal laws.49 
As scholars have noted, prosecutors play an important public 
policy role in the criminal justice system.50 They receive police reports 
of criminal behavior. In some ways, this fact alone makes prosecutors 
a primary line of defense in preventing racially motivated arrest 
decisions from gaining the legitimacy of being addressed through the 
criminal process. Both this moment of racial reckoning and their 
professional responsibilities as members of the legal profession require 
prosecutors to consider that reality and adopt steps to act consistently 
with that role. Making law enforcement, and the community both 
institutions serve, aware of this prosecutorial policy could contribute 
greatly to a less racially biased criminal justice system.  
Prosecutors already have the ability to exercise their authority in 
this way. Their virtually unlimited discretion on whether cases move 
forward in the criminal process means that they can serve as a check 
on police officer decisions about whom to arrest.51 This could be 
 
 47.  See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 
YALE L.J. 2054, 2145 (2017) (describing a process by which police may engage with minority 
communities in an effort to reckon with and ameliorate prior police misconduct). 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Legal estrangement, which details the tense relationship between law enforcement and 
people in poor communities of color, describes a theory of detachment and alienation in law 
enforcement. See generally Bell, supra note 47 (introducing and developing the theory of legal 
estrangement). The perception of this type of regulatory regime is backed by evidence. Social 
science clearly articulates the risk of bias in all forms of decision-making. See L. Song Richardson 
& Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2628, 
2634–41 (2013) (detailing how even well-meaning public defenders make decisions influenced by 
racial bias). The policing environment, and the types of discretionary decisions that occur in such 
an environment, are fertile territory for racial bias. In an important article about racial bias and 
policing, Professors Jillian K. Swencionis and Phillip Atiba Goff describe five situational risk 
factors for racial bias in policing. Swencionis & Goff, supra note 45, at 398. These risk factors are 
discretion, novice status, crime focus, cognitive demand, and identity threats. Id.  
 50.  See Bruce A. Green, Urban Policing and Public Policy – The Prosecutor’s Role, 51 GA. 
L. REV. 1179, 1180 (2017). 
 51.  For an explanation of various ways prosecutors can use their discretion in racially biased 
ways, see generally Angela Davis, In Search of Racial Justice: The Role of the Prosecutor, 16 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2013) (describing ways in which prosecutor’s discretionary 
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considered a form of supervising the police and questioning their patrol 
decisions, but such oversight would serve an important public policy 
objective as it would limit the influence of racial bias in the criminal 
process.52 Technology could also be useful in this attempt to limit racial 
bias in the criminal process through charging discretion. Technological 
tools, such as the body cam, can provide prosecutors with additional 
information about how a police officer directs their attention.53 These 
tools could assist in the attempt to monitor police officers for decisions 
motivated by explicit or implicit racial bias as they would provide clear 
evidence of where a police officer concentrated their efforts.54 
Although prosecutors may not be able to bring criminal charges against 
police departments for choosing certain neighborhoods to monitor 
more frequently and in more intrusive ways, they can call attention to 
these decisions or negate some impact of these decisions by refusing to 
go forward on cases that reflect unfair and unjust monitoring.  
As attorneys subject to a state bar, prosecutors have both a duty 
to ethically proceed in criminal cases and a duty to improve the practice 
of law.55 During this moment of racial reckoning, prosecutors should 
not sit on the sidelines as the public questions police discretion. 
Instead, these attorneys must examine the ways in which their own 
decisions rely on police decisions and ask if there is an acceptable 
method to disentangle themselves from the racially biased outcomes 
that might occur from discriminatory police practices. 
III.  THE GRAND JURY PERFORMANCE PROBLEM 
The grand jury can be complicated. Although its design would 
suggest it serves as a critical way of reinforcing the community’s role in 
the criminal process, its real-life use has proven otherwise. The grand 
jury is not prescribed by the constitution as necessary for a fair criminal 
process in every criminal case.56 This allows for its potential misuse in 
 
decisions play a role in “creating and maintaining the racial disparities in the criminal justice 
system”).  
 52.  See Green, supra note 49, at 1201. 
 53.  See, e.g., Ashley Southall, Police Body Cameras Cited as ‘Powerful Tool’ Against Stop-
and-Frisk Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/nyregion/
nypd-body-cameras.html [https://perma.cc/8RNT-9YTF] (“Police body cameras can help reduce 
the kind of bogus stops that have fueled accusations of racial bias and harassment against police 
officers in New York City, according to a long-awaited report released Monday.”). 
 54.  See id.; Chaz Arnett, Race, Surveillance, and Resistance, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103, 1104–06 
(2020). 
 55.  See Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Regulating Mass Prosecution, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 
1211–22 (2020).  
 56.  See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).  
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cases with a high degree of public interest, such as those involving 
officer use of force.  
The federal government is required to use grand juries for all 
felony cases, but state governments do not have this same 
constitutional obligation.57 Only half of state governments actually use 
grand juries and only 22 of the states that use them require them to be 
used for certain criminal cases.58 Because Kentucky, where Breonna 
Taylor was killed, requires a grand jury for all felony cases, the attorney 
general had to present some evidence before proceeding with any 
potential criminal charges.59 Minnesota, where George Floyd was 
killed, only requires a grand jury to be convened when public interest 
requires it or a county attorney requests it.60  
In some ways, the grand jury can be performative for highly 
publicized cases. This is because aspects of the criminal process are 
naturally performativef.61 Criminal law is most clearly defined as a 
system of regulating behavior that is deserving of society’s moral 
condemnation.62 Hence, the laws are established by a group of the 
community’s representatives and violations of the law are determined 
by community members.63 As a result, much of the trial court process 
happens in public and the final determination is made by general 
members of the community. This inherently creates a degree of public 
performance. Despite this reality, criminal procedural rules are 
 
 57.  See id. at 534, 538. Some state constitutions require the grand jury for certain criminal 
cases. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (requiring grand jury for cases involving capital 
punishment); FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (requiring the grand jury for capital crimes). 
 58.  See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.1(d), (g) (4th ed., 
updated Dec. 2020). 
 59.  KY. CONST. § 12.  
 60.  MINN. R. CRIM. P. 18.01. 
 61.  As Professor Hershini Bhana Young notes,  
The overlap between performance and the law might seem obvious in today’s age of 
trials as public spectacles. Less obvious are the ways in which the law, facing large-scale, 
state-sanctioned historical injustices, has put performance to work . . . [resulting] in a 
subtle shift of emphasis away from judgment and punitive sentencing as the end point 
of legal proceedings. 
Cf. Hershini Bhana Young, Performing the Abyss: Octavia Butler’s Fledgling and the Law, 47 
STUD. NOVEL 210, 210 (2015) (citations omitted). 
 62.  Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Chapter 3: Law, Psychology, and Morality, in 50 
PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING & MOTIVATION 101, 101, 122 (2009) (“People see legal regulation 
of behaviors as a way to define the bounds of good citizenship and to condemn those who do not 
share their worldview.”); see also Sandra G. Mayson, The Concept of Criminal Law, 14 CRIM. L. 
& PHIL. 447, 449 (2020) (defining criminal law as a mechanism of collective condemnation used 
to enact a polity’s shared moral code). 
 63.  Although it is sometimes a sole representative of the government who acts as the 
prosecutor in bringing forward the criminal charges, the process expects the actor to represent 
the community’s interests in doing so and not just their own sense of what is appropriate. 
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instituted to provide some objective formality to the process by 
removing the type of spectacle that could occur if it were strictly a 
performance. 
Grand jury secrecy is actually consistent with the motivations that 
exist to make the criminal process a community process.64 The grand 
jury is composed of members of the community, and their ability to 
evaluate the available evidence in secrecy protects them from any 
subterfuge or undue influence.65 The problem arises in that the 
prosecutor is able to provide whatever information she thinks is 
relevant to the grand jury to aid in their final determination.66 The 
prosecutor also asks the grand jury members to make decisions on only 
the charges the prosecutor deems appropriate.67 This process of 
deciding in advance what is acceptable to promote as warranting a 
probable cause finding is similar to the prosecutor making the decision 
to file charges on her own. If the prosecutor has already determined 
that the case should not go forward, she can act consistently with that 
belief by only presenting the grand jury what she believes will 
encourage the outcome she desires.68  
Scholars have argued that prosecutors should rely on grand juries 
for cases involving law enforcement’s use of force.69 Grand jury scholar 
 
 64.  See Note, Restoring Legitimacy: The Grand Jury as the Prosecutor’s Administrative 
Agency, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1205, 1209 (2017) (“As a traditional aspect of grand juries, secrecy 
has been justified by the rationales of avoiding giving the accused a chance to flee, protecting the 
reputation of the accused prior to an indictment, preventing witness tampering or harassment, 
and fostering uninhibited juror deliberation and investigation.”). 
 65.  Id.; Richer, supra note 35. 
 66.  Restoring Legitimacy, supra note 64, at 1208 (“The complete prosecutorial control over 
the grand jury—particularly over the flow of information and grand jury procedure—solidifies 
the grand jury’s dependence on the prosecutor.”). 
 67.  Id. at 1222–23 (proposing as a reform to the grand jury process that a “grand jury 
representative could be required, as independent counsel, to inform the grand jury of lesser 
charges, which would allow the jury to become more engaged in the process of formulating 
charges”). 
 68.  A prosecutor might choose to use a grand jury to obtain an indictment if they are not 
convinced a judge will support their charging decision. The grand jury process allows the 
prosecutors to move forward on a case without a finding of probable cause by a judge as a neutral 
arbiter of the proceedings. “The most important factor in the grand jury’s probable cause 
determination is the evidence presented during the proceedings, and the prosecutor is the sole 
source of the evidence upon which the grand jury must decide whether to indict.” Id. at 1208. As 
a result, “there is a growing perception that grand juries are the prosecutor’s sword—to be used 
in furtherance of governmental goals—while acting as the prosecutor’s shield from the prying 
eyes of the public.” Id. at 1209. 
 69.  See, e.g., Ric Simmons, The Role of the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury in Police Use of 
Deadly Force Cases: Restoring the Grand Jury to Its Original Purpose, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 519, 
519, 530 (2017) (“[P]rosecutors should feel compelled to use the grand jury to assist them in their 
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Ric Simmons notes the low indictment and conviction rates for police 
officers whose use of force has caused the death of citizens.70 In 
advocating for a dedicated turn to using the grand jury process for 
these types of crimes, he describes three models of the grand jury 
process.  
The first is the “Business as Usual” model where prosecutors 
make a simplistic grand jury presentation.71 In this type of presentation, 
the prosecutor seeks the type of routine approval that has led to a 
generalized belief that grand juries will issue indictments for any case 
a prosecutor puts before them.72 In providing an example for this type 
of model, Simmons turns to Baltimore City Attorney Marilyn Mosby’s 
attempted prosecution of the six police officers involved in the death 
of Freddie Gray.73 Simmons claims this bare-bones presentation of 
evidence actually prevented the prosecutor from identifying certain 
weaknesses in the case and thus led to a complete lack of punishment 
for any of the officers involved.74 
 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Some prosecutors, like Robert McCullough in Ferguson, 
have recognized the value of grand juries in these situations, but most prosecutors have not.”). 
 70.  Id. at 524–25 (“[T]he lower indictment rates in cases involving police lethal use of force 
are evidence that prosecutors are using the grand juries to perform some other function . . . as [a] 
political cover . . . [or] to guide her exercise of prosecutorial discretion . . . .”).  
 71.  Id. at 526–27. 
 72.  Id. at 526. 
 73.  Id. at 526–27. 
 74.  Freddie Gray’s case ended with no convictions for any of the police officers charged in 
his death. Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case Concludes with Zero Convictions 
Against Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016, 8:57 PM) [hereinafter Charges Dropped], 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrial-motions-20160727-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/KD27-FN6Y]. Officer Edward Nero, charged with second-degree assault, was 
acquitted of all charges on May 23, 2016. Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Freddie Gray Case: 
Baltimore Police Officer Edward Nero Found Not Guilty of All Charges, BALT. SUN (May 23, 
2016, 8:07 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-nero-verdict-20160521-
story.html [https://perma.cc/38Z2-4PRA]. Officer Caesar Goodson, who picked up seven charges 
including second-degree depraved heart murder, was acquitted of all seven charges on June 23. 
Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Freddie Gray Case: Officer Caesar Goodson Jr. Not Guilty on All 
Charges, BALT. SUN (June 23, 2016, 9:01 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-
ci-goodson-verdict-20160623-story.html [https://perma.cc/QFL3-FAY3]. Lieutenant Brian Rice, 
with four counts including involuntary manslaughter, was acquitted on July 18. Kevin Rector, 
Judge Acquits Lt. Brian Rice of All Charges in Freddie Gray Case, BALT. SUN (July 18, 2016, 7:32 
PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-rice-verdict-20160718-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/8WQZ-YSMG]. Officer Garrett Miller, charged with three counts the worst of 
which was second-degree assault, had all charges dropped on July 27. Charges Dropped, supra. 
For Officer William Porter, who was facing a charge of involuntary manslaughter on top of three 
others, the judge declared a mistrial in December; seven months later on July 27, prosecutors 
dropped all charges. Id. The same day, prosecutors dropped all charges against Sergeant Alicia 
White who was facing, among others, a charge of involuntary manslaughter. Id.  
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The second model Simmons describes is the “Grand Jury as 
Political Cover” model he ascribes to the criminal process involving the 
death of 12-year-old Tamir Rice,75 a Black child who was shot and 
killed by law enforcement after he was spotted playing with a toy 
replica of a gun in a public recreation center.76 With facts that sound 
achingly familiar to those in the criminal investigation following the 
killing of Breonna Taylor, after months of no official action and 
eventually a municipal court judge’s finding of probable cause,77 
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Tim McGinty presented manipulated 
evidence to a grand jury that resulted in its decision not to indict the 
officer involved.78  
The final model of the grand jury process according to Simmons is 
the “Grand Jury as a Legitimate Community Voice.”79 Simmons uses 
the Michael Brown case as an example of this model.80 In the 
investigation of Brown’s killing, the prosecutor presented over 60 
witnesses to the grand jury.81 He allowed the defendant to testify as 
part of the ordinarily secret grand jury proceedings and even released 
 
 75.  See Simmons, supra note 69, at 527.  
 76.  See Vanessa Romo, Justice Department Declines to Prosecute Cleveland Officers in 
Death of Tamir Rice, NPR (Dec. 29, 2020, 6:27 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/29/951277146/
justice-department-declines-to-prosecute-cleveland-officers-who-killed-tamir-ric 
[https://perma.cc/79S8-QWT9]. 
 77.  See David A. Graham, ‘Probable Cause’ in the Killing of Tamir Rice, ATLANTIC (June 
11, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/tamir-rice-case-cleveland/395420 
[https://perma.cc/F24Q-UTTM]. The Municipal Court judge concluded that the officer 
responsible for killing Tamir Rice should be charged with several crimes, noting the court was 
“thunderstruck at how quickly this event turned deadly.” Id. 
 78.  See Simmons, supra note 69, at 527–28. As Simmons explains, when a prosecutor does 
not want to pursue a case, but does not have the political will to make that decision, they may 
present a weak case to a grand jury. Id. at 527. In these cases, the grand jury is led to issue a no 
true bill. Id. Simmons argues this was the case with respect to McGinty’s decisions regarding 
Tamir Rice’s killing. Id. Several people present at the grand jury proceedings later criticized the 
prosecutors’ presentation of the case, with some likening the prosecutors to defense attorneys 
working on behalf of the officers. Id.; see also Sean Flynn, The Tamir Rice Story: How to Make a 
Police Shooting Disappear, GQ (July 14, 2016), https://www.gq.com/story/tamir-rice-story 
[https://perma.cc/2RE3-EUZ3].  
  Interestingly enough, both Kentucky and Ohio require a grand jury indictment for all 
felony cases. KY. CONST. § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OHIO R. CRIM. P. 7(a).  
 79.  Simmons, supra note 69, at 528.  
 80.  Id. at 528–29. 
 81.  See Erik Eckholm, Witnesses Told Grand Jury That Michael Brown Charged at Darren 
Wilson, Prosecutor Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/
witnesses-told-grand-jury-that-michael-brown-charged-at-darren-wilson-prosecutor-says.html 
[https://perma.cc/PP7U-EU25]. 
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the entire transcript of the proceedings after the jury refused to indict 
the officer.82  
None of these models for the grand jury process are particularly 
comforting with regard to the desire to remove racial bias from the 
probable cause determination in grand jury proceedings. The Business 
as Usual model could encourage some cases to go forward when they 
should not. There are massive emotional, mental, and financial costs to 
both the defendant and the community that await the outcome of a 
criminal investigation when a probable cause determination is made 
erroneously.83 The Grand Jury as Political Cover model undermines 
the integrity of the criminal process. By presenting the case to a grand 
jury as a nation waits with bated breath, the prosecutor could be 
perceived as looking to use the grand jury process to simply issue a 
stamp of approval on a decision the prosecutor has already made.84  
Even the example of the Grand Jury as a Legitimate Community 
Voice provides a problem of racial dynamics. The grand jury or 
preliminary hearing is not meant to be a trial and, indeed, cannot be. 
The criminal process is set up such that the question at this stage is 
whether some evidence exists that a crime has occurred, and the 
defendant is responsible. This is an entirely different question than 
whether reasonable doubt exists that the defendant is guilty, which is 
answered at the trial.85 This means evidentiary standards are 
different,86 and indeed the courts do not assume a role as a neutral 
arbiter to ensure that proceedings are fair.87 Sometimes there is power 
for the community in just knowing the death of an unarmed Black 
person could be considered as a potential crime even if a petit jury, 
using the procedural rules required to ensure a fair and just conviction, 
might conclude it was not unlawful.88 This is why this early stage, and 
 
 82.  Simmons, supra note 69, at 529. 
 83.  Some of these consequences have been clearly outlined in the arrest context. See 
generally Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015) (describing a range of 
consequences—deportation, eviction, license suspension, custody disruption, and adverse 
employment actions simply from the commencement of a criminal process and before conviction).  
 84.  Simmons, supra note 69, at 525.  
 85.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 86.  See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (declining to extend the 
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings). 
 87.   See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50 (1992). (“[A]ny power federal courts 
may have to fashion, on their own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited one, 
not remotely comparable to the power they maintain over their own proceedings.”). 
 88.  This reasoning recalls the historical understanding of how mass incarceration in D.C. 
resulted, at least in part, by the Black community’s desire to be seen as worth being cared for by 
law enforcement – a way of showing their lives and safety mattered. See generally JAMES 
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the lower probable cause standard, can be an important part of the 
criminal law apparatus.  
There are also definitional concerns when asking questions 
beyond the basic probable cause standard or attempting to conduct a 
trial at the grand jury stage. The grand jury is not a trial jury. These two 
types of juries may share a common name and description, but they are 
composed differently, and that difference is reflected in the different 
final questions they must answer.89 At a trial, jury selection ideally 
seeks only those jurors who would be fair and impartial jurors for the 
facts in the particular case at hand. This means that in a case of a police 
officer shooting an unarmed Black person, questions could be asked of 
the potential jurors to root out any explicit or implicit bias that could 
affect their reasoned decision-making. But this type of jury selection 
process does not exist in grand jury proceedings.90 Any introduction of 
racial bias in the criminal process is disturbing and unacceptable, but, 
when racial bias allows a perpetrator to escape the criminal process at 
this initial probable cause determination stage in the grand jury 
proceedings, there is little substitute or entity to make up for that 
failure at a later stage.91 This means bias must be rooted out at the 
earliest stages for communities to maintain faith in the criminal 
process.  
The potential racial bias problems associated with the grand jury 
and the concern with such bias captured in the Rules mean prosecutors 
should reconsider how they use the grand jury. The Business as Usual 
 
FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017) 
(noting how Black leaders in positions of power supported the “War on Crime” in response to a 
rise in crime and drug addiction). Support for increased incarceration and harsher sentencing, 
which knowingly and predominantly impacted Black citizens, was influenced by a desire to both 
attack gun violence in the Black community and force officials to recognize and address the value 
of Black victims and lives. Id. at 60–64. For example, activists in favor of mandatory sentencing 
felt that the sentencing laws on the books were “largely disobeyed and ignored by the judges and 
prosecutors,” citing how only 7.6 percent of those convicted of illegal gun possession had received 
jail time during that period. Id. at 60.  
 89.  Types of Juries, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service/types-
juries [https://perma.cc/J42V-FRTK]. 
 90.  Defense attorneys are not required in grand jury proceedings and prosecutors are 
permitted to present, or decline to present, any evidence they feel is appropriate for the grand 
jury to make their charging decision. 
 91.  There may be some civil redress—such as the $12 million dollar settlement for Breonna 
Taylor’s death—but absent the prosecutor pursuing a preliminary hearing or convening another 
grand jury, both unlikely given the prosecutor’s decision impacting the initial grand jury 
determination, there are no remedies using the criminal process. See Rukmini Callimachi, 
Breonna Taylor’s Family to Receive $12 Million Settlement from City of Louisville, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/us/breonna-taylor-settlement-louisville.html 
[https://perma.cc/BY6W-K8GM].  
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model and the Grand Jury as a Legitimate Community Voice facilitate 
noncompliance with ethical rules.92 The third possibility for the grand 
jury, however, invites additional scrutiny in the cases of police officer 
use of force against unarmed Black people. If evidence arises that a 
prosecutor may have used a grand jury as political cover to account for 
her own decision that there should be no criminal charge in such a case, 
then the appropriate disciplinary committee should investigate. The 
grand jury is simply answering the question of whether there is 
sufficient evidence presented to it to allow for a determination that a 
crime may have been committed. Thus, the prosecutor’s decision to use 
the grand jury to cover her own decision that a crime has not been 
committed, despite widespread community protests indicating the 
contrary, should initiate concerns of whether racial bias has infected 
the prosecutor’s use of the criminal process. This is not to say that the 
prosecutor absolutely behaved in a biased way. It is simply a 
recognition that racial bias can play a part in such decisions, and using 
the grand jury to cover what would otherwise be a routine process for 
the prosecutor presents as proof of using the criminal process in an 
inappropriate manner and must be addressed. 
Even if a jurisdiction requires the prosecutor to turn to a grand 
jury before instituting criminal charges against a defendant, a 
prosecutor can adopt certain practices to limit the role their bias might 
play in the presentation of evidence. These might include having 
neutral parties within the prosecutor’s office examine the charges the 
prosecutor plans to present to the grand jury or having such parties 
evaluate the transcript of the presentation of evidence after the grand 
jury has reached its determination.93 Because this would occur within 
the prosecutor’s office, neither of these would undermine the secrecy 
of the grand jury or the prosecutor’s charging decision. Regardless of 
what type of ameliorative policy is adopted, such a change would help 
the prosecutor better realize how their practice of law might be 
influenced by their personal biases and pursue strategies for reducing 
its discriminatory impact on the criminal process.  
 
 92.  Simmons, supra note 69, at 526, 528.  
 93.   These could be similar to the conviction integrity units that are increasingly becoming a 
part of progressive prosecutor platforms. See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Retooling and 
Coordinating the Approach to Prosecutorial Misconduct, 69 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 623, 667–80 
(2017) (describing conviction integrity units in Dallas, Manhattan, and Brooklyn). 
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CONCLUSION 
There is much to be done in various arenas about the 
circumstances that led to the deaths of Breonna Taylor and George 
Floyd. The same can be said about the many other deaths of unarmed 
Black people that have become seared in the nation’s consciousness 
over the last eight years.94 But one concern that clearly must be 
 
 94.  Since the murder of Trayvon Martin, and long before, the United States has seen an 
uptick in widespread notoriety around the deaths of unarmed Black people. See Steve Martinot, 
On the Epidemic of Police Killings, 39 SOC. JUST. 52, 52–53 (2014). In 2012, Trayvon Martin, a 
Black teenager walking home, was followed and subsequently shot by a layperson adopting the 
role of law enforcement through neighborhood watch. His killer was subsequently acquitted. 
Martinot, supra, at 88. In 2014, Eric Garner was killed by New York police after being put into a 
choke hold on the suspicion of selling loose cigarettes. He uttered “I can’t breathe” eleven times 
during the altercation. Breonna Taylor: Timeline of Black Deaths Caused by Police, BBC NEWS 
(Jan. 6, 2021) [hereinafter Timeline of Black Deaths], https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-
canada-52905408 [https://perma.cc/BQ4S-25NL]. That same year 18-year-old unarmed Michael 
Brown was shot six times by police in Ferguson, Missouri, for allegedly stealing a box of cigars. 
Id. The officer was not prosecuted. Id. Only three months later, 12-year-old Tamir Rice was shot 
dead in Cleveland, Ohio, after reports came in about a “juvenile” pointing a confirmed toy gun 
in the park. The officer faced no charges. Id. In 2015, Sandra Bland, a Black woman from Chicago, 
was found hanged in her jail cell after a confrontational traffic stop in Texas. Id. Though her death 
did not come by way of gunshot, her death was nonetheless the result of law enforcement 
decisions. David Montgomery, Sandra Bland, It Turns Out, Filmed Traffic Stop Confrontation 
Herself, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/us/sandra-bland-video-
brian-encinia.html [https://perma.cc/8AUF-Z5NN]. In 2016, Alton Sterling and Philando Castile 
were killed only a day apart at the hands of law enforcement; the latter shot during a routine 
traffic stop as he reached for his license with his girlfriend and daughter in the car. Timeline of 
Black Deaths, supra. A month later, 23-year-old Korryn Gaines and her five-year-old child were 
both shot in their home by Baltimore police as the incident was live-streamed on social media; 
while her son survived, Korryn was killed. AP, Police Officer Will Not Be Charged in Fatal 
Shooting of Korryn Gaines, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/sep/22/korryn-gaines-fatal-police-shooting-baltimore-no-charges [https://perma.cc/
7YFS-UCCZ]. In 2018, Stephon Clark was gunned down by Sacramento police in his 
grandmother’s yard for holding a cellphone; the police alleged they thought it was a weapon and 
were not charged. Timeline of Black Deaths, supra. In 2019, 23-year-old Elijah McClain was 
stopped by police while walking home, put into a now-illegal chokehold, and was then injected 
with ketamine. Elijah subsequently died following the encounter. Lucy Tompkins, Here’s What 
You Need to Know About Elijah McClain’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/article/who-was-elijah-mcclain.html [https://perma.cc/Z4TJ-88GM]. 
Similar to Sandra Bland, Elijah’s death did not come from a bullet, but was otherwise the result 
of a police encounter. Finally, in 2020, Ahmaud Arbery, a 25-year-old Black man out for a jog, 
was pursued by two armed laypersons adopting the role of law enforcement who ultimately shot 
and killed him. It was three months before the perpetrators were charged. Richard Fausset, Two 
Weapons, a Chase, a Killing and No Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/us/ahmed-arbery-shooting-georgia.html [https://perma.cc/
UUS9-VTRK]. While Arbery’s murder, like Trayvon Martin’s, did not come at the hands of law 
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law enforcement. While this list notes some of the more widely protested deaths of Black people 
killed by law enforcement or those acting in its capacity, the list is certainly not exhaustive. See In 
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addressed is the role the prosecutor plays in allowing racial bias to 
infect the criminal process when they accept a police officer’s version 
of events leading or not leading to a criminal charge without further 
examination or turn to a grand jury determination to approve her own 
biased decision.  
The deaths of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd provide an 
important opportunity to consider what guidance prosecutors follow in 
justifying the decision to criminally prosecute an individual. On a broad 
basis, prosecutors and the attorneys general who serve as the chief law 
enforcement officers among them should reconsider the widespread 
reliance by line prosecutors on police investigations that may 
encompass racially biased law enforcement decisions. Prosecutors 
must pursue ways to ensure that racially biased police decisions such as 
which neighborhoods to monitor more closely and what behavior is 
considered suspicious do not infect a line prosecutor’s decisions on 
when, and how, to charge those who may have violated criminal laws. 
On a more particularized basis, prosecutors should reconsider the use 
of the grand jury in cases involving officer shootings where they have 
the discretion to do so. They should also consider adopting specific 
policies or practices to limit the influence of personal racial bias in the 
grand jury determination. Only in making these two significant changes 
can the state’s chief prosecutor advance an agenda that is both 
compliant with prosecutors’ ethical obligations and consistent with 
their role in the criminal process scheme to protect and maintain the 
stability of the community they represent. There are few things more 
deserving of society’s moral condemnation than the unjustified taking 
of a human life. The taking of that life by those responsible for 
protecting and serving the lives of those in a community should invite 
heightened scrutiny and even more so if the taking was influenced by 
the type of racial bias that has plagued this nation since its inception. 
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